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Access Denied:
How 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) Violates the First
Amendment Rights of Indigent Prisoners
Molly Guptill Manning*
INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment guarantees that Congress “shall make no law . . .
abridging . . . the right of the people . . . to petition the government for a
redress of grievances.”1 Congress and the courts have long recognized that
poverty, and an inability to pay court filing fees, should not bar litigants
from filing a complaint. In 1892, Congress memorialized this principle by
enacting an in forma pauperis statute that waived filing fees for those who
could not afford to pay them.2 As the Supreme Court explained, this statute
was built on the understanding that “no citizen [sh]ould be denied an
opportunity to commence, prosecute, or defend an action, civil or criminal,
Molly Guptill Manning is the author of the New York Times bestseller, When Books
Went to War and The Myth of Ephraim Tutt: Arthur Train and His Great Literary Hoax.
She sits on the Board of Editors of the Federal Bar Council Quarterly. She is a visiting
associate professor at New York Law School and was formerly a supervisory staff
attorney for the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and law clerk to
the Honorable Kevin Nathaniel Fox in the Southern District of New York. She graduated
Phi Beta Kappa and Phi Alpha Theta from the University at Albany, earning B.A. and
M.A. degrees in American History. Thereafter she earned a J.D. from the Benjamin N.
Cardozo School of Law.
1 U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Bill Johnson’s Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731,
741 (1983) (reaffirming that “the right of access to the courts is an aspect of the First
Amendment right to petition the Government for redress of grievances”).
2 Act of July 20, 1892, ch. 209, § 1, 27 Stat. 252. The original in forma pauperis statute
provided that “any citizen of the United States . . . may commence and prosecute to
conclusion any such suit or action without being required to prepay fees or costs.” Id. To
do so, a litigant need only “fil[e] in said court a statement under oath, in writing, that,
because of his poverty, he is unable to pay the costs of said suit or action which he is
about to commence,” and the litigant must provide a brief explanation for why he
“believes he is entitled to the redress he seeks.” Id.
*
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in any court of the United States, solely because his poverty makes it
impossible for him to pay or secure the court costs.”3 Nearly one hundred
years after its original passage, the Supreme Court continued to describe in
forma pauperis status as a safeguard “designed to ensure that indigent
litigants have meaningful access to the federal courts.”4
However, as the federal courts experienced ballooning caseloads in the
1990s, Congress placed significant restrictions on in forma pauperis status
for prisoners.5 Rather than acknowledge the causal link between mass
incarceration and worsening prison conditions, Congress waged a campaign
to reduce the number of prisoner civil rights lawsuits by tinkering with the
requirements for in forma pauperis status.6
In 1995, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) was proposed.
Ignoring the many legitimate grievances prisoners raised in federal courts,
the sponsors of the bill dwelled on the most bogus claims ever filed. “These
suits can involve such grievances as insufficient storage locker space, a
defective haircut by a prison barber, the failure of prison officials to invite a
prisoner to a pizza party for a departing prison employee, and yes, being
served chunky peanut butter instead of the creamy variety,” Senator Dole

Adkins v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 342 (1948) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
4 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989).
5 TRACEY KYCKELHAHN & THOMAS H. COHEN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUST., CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINTS IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS, 1990-2006 1
(2008).
6 141 CONG. REC. 14,413 (1995). When Senator Bob Dole introduced the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, he praised its “several important reforms that would dramatically
reduce the number of meritless prisoner lawsuits.” Id. Bureau of Justice statistics show
that there were mixed results. “Prison petitions involving state inmates declined by 7%
from 24,732 filings in 1999 to 23,122 filings in 2006,” while “federal inmate prison
petitions increased from 962 filings in 1999 to 1,334 filings in 2004 and declined to
1,116 filings by 2006.” KYCKELHAHN & COHEN, supra note 5, at 8. Thus, state filings
decreased since 1999, while federal filings increased.
3
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said.7 The bill’s sponsors aimed to create an “economic disincentive [for
prisoners] to going to court.”8
One of the major changes the PLRA imposed on in forma pauperis status
is that prisoners—and prisoners only—now had to pay the entire filing fee
in installments, while non-prisoners with in forma pauperis status paid
nothing towards the filing fee.9 The PLRA also ushered in a “three strikes
141 CONG. REC. 14,413 (1995) (statement of Sen. Dole). In reality, the “peanut
butter” case involved a prisoner who had ordered two jars of peanut butter from the
prison canteen, one was the wrong variety, and when he returned the jar of the wrong
variety he was never issued a refund. Jon O. Newman, Not All Prisoner Lawsuits Are
Frivolous,
PRISON
LEGAL
NEWS
(April
1996),
available
at
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/1996/apr/15/not-all-prisoner-lawsuits-arefrivolous/ [https://perma.cc/U8MMU-LG8G]. As Second Circuit Judge Jon Newman
remarked, “Maybe $2.50 doesn’t seem like much money, but out of a prisoner’s
commissary account, it is not a trivial loss, and it was for loss of those funds that the
prisoner sued.” Id.
8 141 CONG. REC. 14,413 (1995) (statement of Sen. Dole). “Many prisoners filing
lawsuits today in Federal court claim indigent status. As indigents, prisoners are
generally not required to pay the fees that normally accompany the filing of a lawsuit,”
Senator Dole stated. Id.
9 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(b)(1), (2) (stating that prisoners are “‘required to pay the full
amount of a filing fee’ through a garnishment procedure whereby partial payments of
court fees are made as funds become available in the prisoner’s institutional trust
account”). An initial partial payment of twenty percent of either the average monthly
deposits or average monthly balance (whichever was greater) is made, and thereafter
monthly payments are withdrawn from the prisoner’s account equivalent to “20 percent
of the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s account.” Id.
As explained by Senator Dole when he introduced the PLRA to the Senate, the
“garnishment procedure” would work so that, upon seeking in forma pauperis status, “20
percent of the funds in [the prisoner’s] trust account would be garnished for this purpose.
Every month thereafter, an additional 20 percent of the income credited to the prisoner’s
account would be garnished, until the full amount of the court fees and costs are paidoff.” 141 CONG. REC. 14,413 (1995) (statement of Sen. Doyle). Interestingly, Senator
Dole went on to state that when “law-abiding citizens file a lawsuit, they recognize that
there could be an economic downside to going to court.” Id. Yet, under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a), when non-prisoners are granted in forma pauperis status, they do not pay court
filing fees and thus they do not encounter any “economic downside” to filing a frivolous
lawsuit. Id. “If a law-abiding citizen has to pay the costs associated with a lawsuit, so too
should a convicted criminal,” Senator Dole reasoned. Id. Again, this ignores that nonprisoners proceeding in forma pauperis do not pay any filing fees. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
Under the new requirements established by the PLRA, non-prisoners have continued to
enjoy immunity from paying filing fees when proceeding in forma pauperis; prisoners, on
7
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rule,” codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), which required a prisoner to prepay
an entire filing fee “if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while
incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal . . . that
was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted.”10 Considering that most
prisoners proceed pro se, lack legal education or expertise, and are at the
mercy of whatever limited law library their facility may have, three strikes
can mount quickly.11 The three-strikes bar never expires, and a prisoner
with three strikes can only file a future action upon prepayment of hundreds
of dollars in filing fees.12 Accordingly, prisoners with three strikes, no
money, and lengthy prison terms are barred from seeking redress in federal
court for a prison’s abuses or constitutional violations—no matter how
meritorious the prisoner’s allegations may be.

the other hand, have become responsible for repaying the full amount of filing fees
through a garnishment procedure.
10 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). A single, narrow exception to the prepayment requirement exists
if a “prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” Id.
11 Dismissal of two complaints and one appeal can amount to three strikes. Chavis v.
Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that two strikes accumulate when a
complaint is dismissed on § 1915(g) grounds and an appeal from this dismissal is denied
on listed grounds); see also Jennings v. Natrona Cnty. Det. Ctr. Med. Facility, 175 F.3d
775, 780 (10th Cir. 1999); Hains v. Washington, 131 F.3d 1248, 1250 (7th Cir. 1997)
(per curiam); Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 485 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam);
Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 388 (5th Cir. 1996); Meredith Booker, 20 Years Is
Enough: Time to Repeal the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE
(May
5,
2016),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2016/05/05/20years_plra/
[https://perma.cc/5PYK-Q76E] (stating that, in 2012, “just over 5% of incarcerated
people’s civil rights cases were represented by attorneys,” while 65% of non-prisoner
civil rights plaintiffs secured representation).
At the time this article is being written, COVID-19 is exacerbating the many obstacles
that prisoners already face in preparing court papers; there have been prison law library
closures and weeks-long delays in getting responses to administrative complaints and
grievances. Peter Debelak, We Would Die of the Virus or Not. The System Would Roll
On., N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/27/opinion/prisoncoronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/YQB9-NJAD].
12 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
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Courts that have considered the constitutionality of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)
have upheld the provision time and again.13 Operating under the assumption
that prisoners can save their money and earmark it for a filing fee, federal
courts have failed to consider the significant limitations prisoners face in
obtaining paid employment and in having autonomy over their prison trust
accounts.14 More than half of U.S. prisoners are not able to secure a paying
job within a correctional facility (and those with jobs typically earn cents
per hour), and prisoners with financial obligations (ranging from restitution
to child support and student loans) may be contractually obligated to make
installment payments towards these debts.15 Thus, over one million
prisoners cannot earn money to save, and those who can earn money may
be required to spend it on other financial obligations.16 Consequently,
See, e.g., Lewis v. Sullivan, 279 F.3d 526, 527 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that seven
Courts of Appeals had considered the constitutionality of § 1915(g) on a variety of bases,
“including [a] due process right of access to the courts, the equal protection clause, the ex
post facto clause, the first amendment right to petition for redress of grievances, and
several others”; none of the challenges to this subsection have “succeeded”; and all of the
seven “decisions [were] sound”). Id. It bears noting that, although the Seventh Circuit
specifically referred to an “access to the courts” challenge, it did not cite to the most
relevant Supreme Court cases on prisoner access-to-the-courts claims discussed in Part V
of this article—notably Wolff v. McDonnell and Bounds v. Smith. Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539, 542 (1974); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 827 (1977). These Supreme
Court cases predated Lewis v. Sullivan and squarely addressed the requirements of
prisoner access-to-the-courts claims. Id. These Supreme Court cases support the principle
that a litigant whose nonfrivolous claims are barred because of an inability to pay a filing
fee may sufficiently allege an access-to-the-courts violation. See infra Part V.
14 See, e.g., Sanders v. Melvin, 873 F.3d 957, 959–60 (7th Cir. 2017) (stating that a
three-strikes prisoner should “save up” and pay the filing fee if he wished to pursue his
complaint).
15 See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 545.11 (2021) (detailing the Bureau of Prison’s “Inmate
Financial Responsibility Program” and listing the various categories of financial
obligations a prisoner may have and the “priority” of payments to be made—ranging
from criminal court fees, restitution, student loans, outstanding taxes, and many others);
Daniel Moritz-Rabson, ‘Prison Slavery’: Inmates Are Paid Cents While Manufacturing
Products
Sold
to
Government,
NEWSWEEK
(Aug.
28,
2018),
https://www.newsweek.com/prison-slavery-who-benefits-cheap-inmate-labor-1093729
[https://perma.cc/VRD3-7B9T] (stating that only half of all prisoners are able to secure a
paying job while incarcerated).
16 Id.
13
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indigent three-strikes prisoners may have no ability to save an entire federal
filing fee before commencement of a federal action or appeal.17 An “access
to the courts” claim is the proper vehicle for challenging an obstacle (such
as prepayment of a filing fee) preventing a litigant from obtaining judicial
review of a nonfrivolous claim.18 Ironically, however, if an indigent threestrikes litigant wanted to raise a First Amendment challenge—that
prepayment of a filing fee bars access to the courts because the prisoner
cannot amass $400 for a district court filing fee—the prisoner cannot obtain
review of his claim without paying the very filing fee he is alleging he
cannot pay. It is an unconstitutional Catch-22.
This article argues that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) should be amended or
repealed because it denies indigent prisoners access to the federal courts to
litigate nonfrivolous claims, in violation of the First Amendment. Part I of
this article traces the history of filing fee waivers for indigent litigants and
the duality that exists between prisoner and non-prisoner litigants. Part II
explores the legislative history for the PLRA and what the sponsors of this
legislation hoped to achieve. Part III examines 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and
28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (providing that a district court filing fee is $350); 28 U.S.C. §
1914 (District Court Miscellaneous Fee Schedule, listing other court costs and fees,
including a $50 “administrative fee for filing a civil action, suit, or proceeding in a
district court.”). The $50 administrative fee “does not apply to . . . persons granted in
forma pauperis status under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.” Id. Thus, this is yet another expense that
prisoners face if they file three unsuccessful actions and are no longer eligible for in
forma pauperis status because of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Court of Appeals Miscellaneous
Fee Schedule, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS. ¶ 1 (effective Oct. 1, 2019),
https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/fees/court-appeals-miscellaneous-fee-schedule
[https://perma.cc/8ZMB-WXTG] (stating that the docketing fee for a federal appeal is
$500). Not only is a federal appeal more costly than the filing of a complaint in district
court, but the period of time to file an appeal (and pay the docketing fee) is short: either
thirty or sixty days, depending on whether the U.S. Government or its officials are named
parties to the lawsuit. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A)–-(B) (setting forth a thirty-day period to
file a notice of appeal from entry of judgment and a sixty-day period when one of the
parties is the United States, a United States agency, or a United States employee).
18 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351–52 (1996) (explaining that an access-to-the-courts
claim requires allegations of “actual injury”—that “a nonfrivolous legal claim had been
frustrated or was being impeded.”).
17
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how the federal courts have reasoned that it does not impose an
unconstitutional burden on prisoners. Part IV details the constraints on
prisoners’ ability to earn and save income to pay a lump-sum filing fee. Part
V analyzes “access to the courts” claims and what the Supreme Court has
required to successfully assert such a claim in the realm of prisoner civil
rights litigation. Finally, Part VI argues why amendment or repeal of 28
U.S.C. § 1915(g) would best achieve Congress’ goals for the PLRA, ease
the burden on federal courts by enabling them to efficiently manage their
caseloads, and ensure that indigent prisoners with three strikes do not lose
their First Amendment right to file nonfrivolous claims.

I. HISTORY OF COURT FEE WAIVERS
A. Legislative History
In June 1892, a bill was introduced in the House of Representatives that
would “open the courts of the United States to a class of persons who are
now denied the right of bringing suits in the courts of the United States, that
have no money or property by which to comply with the rules of the courts
in respect to costs.”19 After a few clerical amendments and brief discussion
about the requirement that an indigent plaintiff submit an affidavit detailing
his inability to pay court fees, the bill was passed.20 The Senate, equally
satisfied with the principle that the aggrieved should be able to seek
recourse in the federal courts irrespective of their financial ability to pay
court fees, favored the bill.21 In July 1892, it became law that

23 CONG. REC. 5,199 (1892) (statement of Rep. Culberson).
Id.
21 23 CONG. REC. 6,291 (1892) (“A further message from the Senate, . . . announced that
the Senate had passed without amendment bills of the following titles. . . . A bill (H.R.
8153) providing when plaintiff may sue as a poor person and when counsel shall be
assigned by the court.”). Days later, the Senate received word that the President of the
United States had approved and signed the bill. 23 CONG. REC. 6,543 (1892).
19
20
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any citizen . . . may commence and prosecute . . . any [federal] suit
or action without being required to prepay fees or costs . . . upon
filing . . . a statement under oath, in writing, that, because of his
poverty, he is unable to pay the costs of said suit or action.22
Over the next one hundred years, small tweaks were made to the 1892 in
forma pauperis statute as well as other legislation governing the waiver of
court fees for indigent litigants to expand the scope of the original Act. For
example, while the original legislation seemed to contemplate the waiver of
court fees only in trial court proceedings, a 1910 amendment broadened the
original statute after federal courts held it was inapplicable to appellate
proceedings and writs of error.23 The new language provided that
any citizen . . . may . . . commence and prosecute or defend to
conclusion any suit or action, or a writ of error, or an appeal to the
circuit court of appeals, or to the Supreme Court in such suit or
action, including all appellate proceedings . . . without being
required to prepay fees or costs or for the printing of the record in
the appellate court.24
This amendment also provided that a trial court could essentially revoke in
forma pauperis status for an appeal by determining that an “appeal or writ
of error is not taken in good faith.”25 If the district court does not revoke in
Act of July 20, 1892, ch. 209, 27 Stat. 252 (“An act providing when plaintiff may sue
as a poor person and when counsel shall be assigned by the court.”).
23 45 CONG. REC. 8,626–27 (1910) (proposing that the in forma pauperis statute “section
1, chapter 209, of the United States Statutes at Large, volume 27” be amended to include
the language that an indigent litigant could seek in forma pauperis status to “commence
and prosecute or defend to conclusion any suit or action, or a writ of error, or an appeal
to the circuit court of appeals, or to the Supreme Court . . . .”) (emphasis added);
Bradford v. S. R.R. Co., 195 U.S. 243, 250–52 (1904). In Bradford, the Supreme Court
held that “[w]e adhere to the view that the [in forma pauperis] act, on its face, does not
apply to appellate proceedings,” and when addressing whether a writ of error could be
prosecuted in forma pauperis, “we find no statute authorizing any order to that effect.” Id.
at 250, 252.
24 Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 435, 36 Stat. 866.
25 45 CONG. REC. 1,767 (1910) (discussing a proposed amendment to include “good
faith” language). In Wells v. United States, the Supreme Court explained a “Circuit Court
of Appeals could allow an appeal in forma pauperis to review, in the light of all the
22
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forma pauperis status, a litigant would continue to have this status on
appeal.26
In 1944, Congress amended 28 U.S.C. § 9, governing court reporters, and
this statute provided that “fees for transcripts furnished in . . . proceedings
to persons permitted to appeal in forma pauperis shall . . . be paid by the
United States if the trial judge or a circuit judge shall certify that the appeal
is not frivolous but presents a substantial question.”27 When the federal
Judicial Code of 1911 was restructured, the in forma pauperis statute was
codified
as
28
U.S.C.
§ 1915; this version of the statute included the requirement that indigent
litigants file an affidavit detailing their inability to pay court costs and
provided that indigent litigants could request free production of necessary
transcripts.28 Until 1996, Congress made only ministerial changes to the
text of the statute.29
B. Court Decisions
During the latter half of the twentieth century, courts consistently
recognized the importance of ensuring that all litigants—whether they were
circumstances, the adequacy of the district court’s certificate,” but when an appeal does
not challenge the trial court’s good faith determination, the denial of “in forma pauperis
must . . . be affirmed.” Wells v. United States, 318 U.S. 257, 260 (1943).
26 This principle is memorialized in Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3)(A):
A party who was permitted to proceed in forma pauperis in the district-court
action, . . . may proceed on appeal in forma pauperis without further
authorization unless . . . the district court—before or after the notice of appeal
is filed—certifies that the appeal is not taken in good faith or finds that the
party is not otherwise entitled to proceed in forma pauperis and states in
writing its reasons for the certification or finding.
27 Act of Jan. 20, 1944, ch. 3, 58 Stat. 5, 6(c) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 9).
28 See generally Edgar E. Bethell & Herschel Friday, The Federal Judicial Code of
1948, 3 ARK. L. REV. 146, 146 (1949) (noting the retailoring of the Judicial Code and the
consolidation of related statutes under Title 28 of the United States Code); see also 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(a) (providing for waiver of court fees), (b) (providing that a transcript or
record on appeal may be paid for by the United States when authorized by the Director of
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts).
29 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (legislative history).
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behind prison bars or not—were able to access the courts irrespective of
their financial ability to pay fees. In fact, some courts were especially
solicitous about prisoners’ access to federal tribunals. For example, the
Seventh Circuit stated in 1973, “[a]n inmate’s right of unfettered access to
the courts is as fundamental a right as any other he may hold. . . . All other
rights of an inmate are illusory without it.”30 The Fifth Circuit along with
federal district courts across the country adopted this principle verbatim—
or nearly so.31
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the United States Supreme Court
reaffirmed the importance of ensuring that prisoners’ right to access the
courts remain unimpeded. In Hudson v. Palmer, the Supreme Court noted
that it had “repeatedly held that prisons are not beyond the reach of the
Constitution,” and that “[l]ike others, prisoners have the constitutional right
to petition the Government for redress of their grievances, which includes a
reasonable right of access to the courts.”32 The Supreme Court also assailed
the importance of prisoner civil rights actions: “As this Court has
‘constantly emphasized,’ . . . civil rights actions are of ‘fundamental
importance . . . in our constitutional scheme’ because they directly protect
our most valued rights.”33
Nevertheless, during the mid-1990s, Congress made clear that it viewed
civil rights cases in a different light. At a time when federal courts faced
burgeoning caseloads, Congress aimed its remedial legislation at only one
group of people: prisoners. At the time, the prison population in the United
Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619, 630 (7th Cir. 1973).
McCray v. Sullivan, 509 F.2d 1332, 1337 (5th Cir. 1975) (quoting Adams, 488 F.2d at
630); Arruda v. Fair, 547 F. Supp. 1324, 1335 (D. Mass. 1982) (same); Sims v. Brierton,
500 F. Supp. 813, 815 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (same); Keker v. Procunier, 398 F. Supp. 756, 762
(E.D. Ca. 1975) (same); Rizzo v. Zubrik 391 F. Supp. 1058, 1060 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (“It is
thus apparent that an inmate’s right of unfettered access to the courts is as fundamental a
right as any other he may hold.”).
32 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523 (1984).
33 Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 827 (1977) (quoting Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483,
485 (1969); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974)).
30
31
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States was dramatically rising. In 1980, the combined state and federal
prison population totaled 315,974.34 By 1994, this total had more than
doubled, rising to 1,016,691.35 While some sources attribute this increase in
prisoner filings to the expansion of civil rights legislation—such as the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (the
latter of which amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973—this attribution
ignores the reality that the “War on Drugs” led to an increase in
incarceration rates that, in turn, led to an increase in prisoner court filings.36
Between 1970 and 2009, the prison population went from 196,429 state and
federal inmates to 1,613,740.37 It is easy to deduct that this eightfold
increase in under thirty years could result in an array of deficiencies
amounting to constitutional violations, such as poor “sanitation, fire safety,
medical care, mental health care, diet, exercise, and protection of inmates
from assaults,” that would only be exacerbated by overcrowding.38 To
compare statistics, as the total case filings by state and federal inmates
“increase[d] from 25,992 in 1990 to 41,215 in 1996,”39 the prison
population grew from 739,980 in 1990 to 1,137,722 in 1996.40 These
figures are in lockstep with one another: as filings increased by 63%, the
prison population grew by 65%.41
Rather than acknowledge that the trend towards mass incarceration
would inevitably lead to poor conditions prompting more prisoner civil
U.S. State and Federal Prison Population, 1925-2018, Chart in U.S. State and Federal
Prison
Population,
1925-2017,
THE
SENT’G
PROJECT,
https://www.sentencingproject.org/criminal-justice-facts/
[https://perma.cc/K8JACMCC].
35 Id.
36 KYCKELHAHN & COHEN, supra note 5, at 1–2.
37 U.S. State and Federal Prison Population, 1925-2017, supra note 34.
38 Alan J. Kessel, Prisoners’ Rights: Unconstitutional Prison Overcrowding, 1986 ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 737, 737 (1986).
39 KYCKELHAHN & COHEN, supra note 5, at 8.
40 U.S. State and Federal Prison Population, 1925-2017, supra note 34.
41 Id.
34
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rights complaints, Congress focused on reducing caseloads by creating
roadblocks for prisoners seeking redress for violations of their
constitutional rights.

II. THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT
In 1995, Senator Bob Dole introduced the PLRA, stating that the
legislation was critical to respond to the staggering increase of prisoner
court filings.42 “Frivolous lawsuits filed by prisoners tie up the courts, waste
valuable resources, and affect the quality of justice enjoyed by law-abiding
citizens,” he said.43 “I happen to believe that prisons should be just that—
prisons, not law firms.”44 Senators, stoking a jocular tone, even created a
“Top 10 Frivolous Inmate Lawsuits” list, which included a complaint filed
over being served melted (not frozen) ice cream, another complaint alleging
“that being forced to listen to his unit manager’s country and western music
constituted cruel and unusual punishment,” an action “demanding L.A.
Gear or Reeb[ok] ‘Pumps’ instead of Converse,” and a complaint asserting
that “unidentified physicians implanted mind control devices in [the
plaintiff’s] head.”45 The sponsors acted on the presumption that prisons

141 CONG. REC. 14,413 (1995) (statement of Sen. Dole).
Id. Senator Dole went on to state that the “time and money spent defending these
cases are clearly time and money better spent prosecuting violent criminals, fighting
illegal drugs, or cracking down on consumer fraud.” Id. However, the claims he
identified—such as a prisoner who filed a complaint because he was served chunky
instead of creamy peanut butter—could be dismissed as facially insufficient and would
require no “time and money spent” on defense. Id.
44 141 CONG. REC. 14,413 (1995) (statement of Sen. Dole).
45 141 CONG. REC. 14,629 (1995). It bears noting that some of the cases that legislators
labelled as “frivolous” during congressional debates are quite possibly meritorious. For
example, senators described as “frivolous” the claim that “the prison chaplain refused to
perform [a] same-sex religious ceremony.” 141 CONG. REC. 14,627 (1995); see also
Sandoval v. Obenland, No. 3:17-cv-05667, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27003, at *8–9 (W.D.
Wash., Jan. 29, 2019) (reviewing claim that a prison’s “marriage policy discriminates
against prisoners who intend to marry members of the same gender,” and denying the
claim because the prison’s policy statement required only that “the offender and the
intended spouse . . . be eligible to legally marry . . . in Washington State,” and it was
42
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rarely violated the constitutional rights of their prisoners and that
correctional facilities were owed the benefit of the doubt in how they
treated prisoners.46
Yet prisoner litigation can involve egregious behavior by correctional
officers and the blatant violation of prisoners’ constitutional rights. The
congressional debates regarding the PLRA largely ignored common civil
actions that prisoners have filed to protect their constitutional rights—
including violation of their freedom of religion,47 deliberate indifference to
their medical needs,48 inadequate medical assistance,49 and a failure to
protect inmates from harm.50 Additionally, some cases evidence prison-

“undisputed that same-sex couples are legally allowed to marry in the State of
Washington.”).
46 For example, Senator Dole noted that there would be “some tough new guidelines for
Federal courts when evaluating legal challenges to prison conditions.” 141 CONG. REC.
14,626 (1995) (statement of Sen. Dole). Later, prisoner lawsuits were referred to as a
“waste [of] valuable legal resources” and “garbage.” 141 CONG. REC. 14,626, 14,627
(1995) (statements of Sen. Dole & Sen. Reid).
47 See, e.g., Gartrell v. Ashcroft, 191 F. Supp. 2d 23 (D.D.C. 2002) (reviewing claims by
a Rastafarian inmate who alleged that it violated his religion to be required to shave his
beard and cut his hair as required by his facility’s grooming policy, and by two Sunni
Muslims who alleged that shaving their beards violated a “fundamental tenet of Islam,”
and ruling that the plaintiffs’ rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act had
been violated and that they were entitled to a permanent injunction to prevent the future
violation of their religious rights).
48 See. e.g., Feliciano v. Gonzalez, 13 F. Supp. 2d 151, 208 (D.P.R. 1998) (determining
that “defendants have continuously acted with deliberate indifference toward the
standards of care ‘within the modern and prudent professional standards’ by delaying or
denying access to medical attention to serious and urgent medical needs of inmates, all
without any penological purpose”).
49 See, e.g., Tillery v. Owens, 719 F. Supp. 1256, 1305–06 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (noting that
“only 2 doctors and a maximum of 8 registered nurses attend to the medical needs of
over 1800 inmates,” and there were “[in]sufficient clerical staff,” which led to “medical
services [that were] constitutionally inadequate”).
50 See, e.g., Miles v. Baker, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4873, at *7–9 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 15,
1992) (determining a prison guard was not entitled to summary judgment on a “failure to
protect” claim when the evidence showed that he knew the plaintiff had been threatened
by a group of prisoners called the “Gangster Disciples,” the guard left his assigned post
at a time when the plaintiff was recreating with known members of the Gangster
Disciples, the guard heard the plaintiff cry for help as he was assaulted by the Gangster
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wide abuse. For example, in Littler v. Martinez, the district court remarked
that the facts “paint[ed] a bleak picture of inmate treatment” throughout an
entire correctional facility, as the record demonstrated that the defendants
brutalized the plaintiff, Phillip Littler, by “intentionally sh[ooting] [Littler]
in the face with a pepperball gun at point-blank range”; “repeatedly
spray[ing] [Littler] with a chemical agent”; “slamm[ing] [Littler] into the
wall and punch[ing] [him] in the head several times”; and “attempt[ing]
before, during, and after the incident to cover it up, including by creating an
apparently false incident report and by submitting an arguably false sworn
declaration to the Court.” 51
A single senator, Joe Biden, expressed concern that “we must not lose
sight of the fact that some of these lawsuits have merit—some prisoner’s
rights are violated.”52 He cited, in support, abuse at a juvenile detention
center where children were beaten with chains and a women’s correctional
facility where inmates were frequently raped by correctional officials.53
Disciples, and the guard did not assist the plaintiff even though the guard testified that
“no single inmate could have prevented him from coming to the aid of another inmate”).
51 Littler v. Martinez, No. 2-16-CV-00472, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155868, **1–3, 24–
25 (S. D. Ind., Sept. 13, 2018). In conclusion, the decision stated:
The Court is deeply troubled by what the evidence produced thus far in this
action reveals about the constitutional guarantees to which inmates at Wabash
Valley, including ostensibly difficult ones as Mr. Littler, are entitled. If Mr.
Littler’s version of events is even partially true—which several of the emails
and other documents almost indisputably show it is—his constitutional right to
be free from cruel and unusual punishment has been flagrantly ignored by
several staff members at Wabash Valley, including by those at the highest
levels of administration.
Id. at *30. Among the emails submitted at summary judgment was one from a corrections
captain asking the assistant superintendent whether there was a “min distance for the
pepperball” because the captain was “in the giving mood,” and the assistant
superintendent responded “I love that. lol.” Id. at *10. In the end, the parties reached a
settlement that was favorable to Littler, and the action ended with a stipulation of
dismissal. Stipulation of Dismissal, Littler v. Martinez, No. 2:16-cv-00472 (S.D. Ind.
Mar. 15, 2020).
52 141 CONG. REC. 14,628 (1995) (statement of Sen. Biden).
53 Id.; see also Santiago v. City of Philadelphia, 435 F. Supp. 136 (E.D. Pa. 1977)
(alleging conditions at a juvenile detention center were unconstitutional); Women
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Although the sponsors of the bill provided assurances that meritorious
complaints and appeals would not be affected—stating “I do not want to
prevent inmates from raising legitimate claims” and that “[t]his legislation
will not prevent those claims from being raised”—there was no discussion
of how 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) could bar legitimate claims.54 Specifically,
legislators did not consider how this provision barred prisoners from filing
federal complaints (no matter how meritorious) unless an inmate produced
a $400 lump-sum filing fee.55 Rather, the sponsors of the bill continued to
insist that prisoner filings needed to be curbed and that amending the in
forma pauperis statute was the best method of achieving this goal. As
Senator Dole stated, in forma pauperis status was to be modified, for
prisoners only, to create an “economic disincentive to going to court.”56
To create this disincentive, the PLRA requires a prisoner to jump through
several hoops to proceed in forma pauperis. Before passage of the PLRA, a
prisoner—like any other litigant seeking in forma pauperis status—needed
only to file an affidavit detailing all assets and stating an inability to pay the
filing fee.57 When the PLRA became law in 1996, it added subsection (b) to
28 U.S.C. § 1915, which provided that, notwithstanding the filing of an
affidavit alleging indigency, “if a prisoner brings a civil action or files an
appeal in forma pauperis, the prisoner shall be required to pay the full
amount of a filing fee.”58 To achieve this, the “court shall assess and, when
funds exist, collect, as a partial payment of any court fees required by law,
an initial partial filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of” either the
Prisoners of D.C. Dep’t of Corr. v. District of Columbia, 877 F. Supp. 634 (D.D.C. 1994)
(involving female prisoners alleging various civil rights violations).
54 141 CONG. REC. 14,627 (1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
55 See id.
56 141 CONG. REC. 14,627 (1995) (statement of Sen. Dole). “Many prisoners filing
lawsuits today in Federal court claim indigent status. As indigents, prisoners are
generally not required to pay the fees that normally accompany the filing of a lawsuit,”
Senator Dole stated during Senate debate over the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Id.
57 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
58 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) (emphasis added).
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“average monthly deposits to the prisoner’s account” or “the average
monthly balance in the prisoner’s account for the 6-month period
immediately preceding the filing of the complaint or notice of appeal.”59
Thereafter, a prisoner is required to make monthly payments and the
“agency having custody of the prisoner shall forward payments from the
prisoner’s account to the clerk of court . . . until the filing fees are paid.”60
Thus, by filing any civil litigation and seeking in forma pauperis status, a
prisoner must agree to make installment payments towards the full cost of
the filing fee.61
But what if a prisoner has no funds to contribute towards these
installments? Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4), “[i]n no event shall a prisoner
be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil or criminal
judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by
which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”62 Thus, the statute acknowledges
that some prisoners may be unable to raise funds to make an initial partial
payment of a filing fee. As discussed further in Part III, there is no similar
28 U.S.C. § 1915(1)(A)-(B). To achieve the garnishment of filing fees from a
prisoner’s account, courts generally require a prisoner to complete a form authorizing the
deduction of funds. For example, the district court for the Eastern District of New York
requires a prisoner to complete a “PLRA authorization” form that states:
I [name of plaintiff] request and authorize the facility institution or agency
holding me in custody to send to the Clerk of the UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK . . . a
certified copy of my prison account statement for the past six months. I further
request and authorize the facility or agency holding me in custody to calculate
the amounts specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b), to deduct those amounts from
my prison trust fund account (or institutional equivalent), and to disburse those
amounts to the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN
DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.
Podius v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 16-CV-6121 (RRM)(PK), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
39092, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2017).
60 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
61 Id. In contrast, a non-prisoner who is granted in forma pauperis status does not have to
make any payments towards the filing fee. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (applying to all
litigants, including non-prisoners), with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) (adding the garnishment
requirement for prisoners).
62 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4).
59
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provision for prisoners falling under subsection (g), colloquially known as
the “three-strikes rule,” whereby a prisoner who accumulates three “strikes”
must prepay the entire filing fee.63
The Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have described 28 U.S.C. §
1915(b)(4) as a “saving provision [that] sufficiently guarantees that all
prisoners will have access to the courts, regardless of their income.”64 Other
Circuits have also acknowledged the wisdom of this “saving” clause. In the
words of the Third Circuit, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) “plainly means that the
courts may not prohibit a prisoner from filing a new complaint for the
reason that he does not possess any assets at the time of filing.”65 The Sixth
Circuit has stated that “the PLRA itself has provisions that prevent
assessments from being so burdensome that they would stop a prisoner
from being able to bring suit.”66 The Tenth Circuit has joined this
reasoning, stating the “PLRA does not prohibit a prisoner from bringing a
civil action or appealing a civil judgment when he has no assets or means to
pay an initial partial filing fee.”67 Thus, Circuits considering whether the
garnishment procedure violated prisoners’ right to access the courts have
rejected such challenges because the statute explicitly allows prisoner
lawsuits even when a prisoner has no ability to pay the first installment of a
court fee under the garnishment mechanism.68
Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4), with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
Norton v. Dimazana, 122 F.3d 286, 291 (5th Cir. 1997); see also Nicholas v. Tucker,
114 F.3d 17, 21 (2d Cir. 1997) (analyzing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2)’s requirements that
prisoners pay the filing fee in installments and concluding that this does “not deny
prisoners such meaningful access [to the courts],” as an “overriding theme of the in
forma pauperis amendments is that in no event shall a prisoner unable to afford the filing
fee be prevented from pursuing his claim.”); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 848 (9th
Cir. 2002) (“the safety-valve provision ensures that a prisoner cannot be barred from
bringing a civil action or an appeal when he or she does not have enough money to pay
the initial fee”).
65 Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 314 (3d Cir. 2001).
66 Singleton v. Smith, 241 F.3d 534, 538 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4)).
67 Cosby v. Meadors, 351 F.3d 1324, 1327 (10th Cir. 2003) (citing 28 U.S.C. §
1915(b)(4)).
68 See id.
63
64
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However, this begs the question: If 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) preserves
prisoners’ access to the courts by allowing litigation to proceed if a prisoner
cannot pay a partial filing fee, then how can 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) pass
constitutional scrutiny if an indigent three-strikes prisoner is denied review
of a nonfrivolous complaint because of their inability to pay an entire filing
fee?

III. THE “THREE STRIKES” RULE, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(G)
The PLRA’s most problematic amendment to the in forma pauperis
statute has been 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), colloquially known as the “three
strikes” rule.69 Under this provision, “[i]n no event shall a prisoner bring a
civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding” without
prepayment of filing fees
if the prisoner, on 3 or more occasions, while incarcerated or
detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of
the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted.70
For prisoners who typically proceed pro se, lack legal skills, and are
beholden to whatever resources are available in their prison’s law library,
accumulating three “strikes” is not difficult to do.71 Filing an unsuccessful

Molly Guptill Manning, Trouble Counting to Three: Circuit Splits and Confusion in
Interpreting the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s ‘Three Strikes Rule,’ 28 U.S.C. §
1915(g), 28 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 207 (2018) (providing an overview of 28
U.S.C. § 1915(g) and detailing some of the issues that have caused Circuit splits in
interpreting what dismissals constitute a “strike”).
70 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
71 See U.S. Courts of Appeals—Judicial Business 2018, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS.
(2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/us-courts-appeals-judicial-business2018 [https://perma.cc/3DQD-QKTL] (stating that “[e]ighty-five percent of the 13,475
prisoner petitions received were filed pro se, as were 87 percent of the 5,041 original
proceedings and miscellaneous applications”).
69
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complaint and appealing its dismissal can constitute two strikes; the filing
of another unsuccessful complaint could be a third.72
There is a single exception to the “three strikes” rule’s fee requirement: if
a prisoner sufficiently alleges “imminent danger of serious physical injury,”
the prisoner may be allowed to proceed with a complaint without
prepayment of the filing fee (although the filing fee would be gradually
collected under the garnishment procedure in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)).73 While
the PLRA was supposed to ease the burden on federal courts, 28 U.S.C. §
1915(g) has produced a significant body of case law. Most cases are
focused on determining whether particular types of dismissal orders
constitute a strike—and Circuits are split on several discrete issues.74 But
one issue that courts generally agree upon is that this provision does not
place an undue financial burden on prisoners.
Shortly after the PLRA became law, several Courts of Appeals
considered
whether
§ 1915(g) creates an unconstitutional obstacle for prisoners to access the
courts, and all of them ruled that it does not. The Fifth Circuit reasoned in
See cases cited supra note 11.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (providing the “imminent danger of serious physical injury”
exception).
74 See Manning, supra note 69. Since Trouble Counting to Three was published, the
Supreme Court has ruled that any dismissal to state a claim—whether with or without
prejudice—constitutes a strike. Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 140 S. Ct. 1721, 1727 (2020).
However, in so ruling, the Supreme Court carved a significant exception from its
holding: that a dismissal with leave to amend does not constitute a strike because
“amendment can cure a deficient complaint” and “the suit continues.” Id. at 1724 n.4.
This footnote may produce a new body of case law, as it is amenable to different
interpretations. Does the footnote mean that only dismissals with leave to amend do not
count as strikes? Or that dismissals based on a “curable deficiency” do not count as
strikes because once the deficiency is cured the “suit continues?” Id. One basis for
dismissal with leave to amend might be a failure to exhaust administrative remedies. This
is a curable defect. However, one judge may dismiss a complaint for failure to exhaust
and grant leave to amend once exhaustion is complete, while another judge may simply
dismiss a complaint for failure to exhaust. Should the two be treated differently under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(g)? Time will tell how the federal courts interpret Lomax and the
exception provided in footnote 4.
72
73
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1997 that § 1915(g) “does not prevent a prisoner with three strikes from
filing civil actions; it merely prohibits him from enjoying [in forma
pauperis] status.”75 The Fifth Circuit added: “He still has the right to file
suits if he pays the full filing fees in advance, just like everyone else.”76
This “just like everyone else” reasoning, however, ignores that nonprisoners can file more than three actions or appeals that are dismissed as
frivolous or malicious, or for failing to state a claim, and can continue to
seek and receive in forma pauperis status—and these non-prisoner informa-pauperis litigants pay nothing towards filing fees.77 Examples
include legions of non-prisoner in-forma-pauperis litigants filing dozens of
meritless actions without paying a cent towards filing fees. By way of
example, one litigant in North Carolina filed “no fewer than 17 federal
lawsuits, seeking [in forma pauperis] status in most or all of them,” and he
was simply “warned that federal courts have the authority to limit vexatious
and repetitive litigants’ access to the courts by ordering a pre-filing
injunction against those litigants.”78 In the District of Columbia, a litigant
who had filed forty-nine prior cases in less than eighteen months, and
proceeded to file twenty-one complaints and applications to proceed in
forma pauperis in a single month, was granted in forma pauperis status and
ordered to show cause why an order should not issue “barring him from
filing any new civil actions in this judicial district without payment of the
applicable filing fee.”79 The Tenth Circuit placed a “leave-to-file”
restriction (the litigant had to request permission of the court before filing
another pro se action) only after the litigant had filed twenty appeals
Carson v. Johnson, 112 F.3d 818, 821 (5th Cir. 1997); Rivera v. Allin, 144. F.3d 719,
723 (11th Cir. 1998) (same).
76 Carson, 112 F.3d at 821.
77 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
78 Emrit v. Bank of Am., Inc., No. 3:13cv547-RJC-DSC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189632
at *5–6 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 7, 2013).
79 Colbert v. Cincinnati Police Dep’t, 867 F. Supp. 2d 34, 34–37 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2011).
Ultimately, this litigant was enjoined from proceeding in forma pauperis in the district
court for the District of Columbia. Order, Colbert, 867 F. Supp. 2d 34 (No. 11-cv-2250).
75
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(seeking in forma pauperis status in at least some of them).80 Indeed, nonprisoners are granted tremendous leeway in securing in forma pauperis
status despite patterns of abuse.
Thus, the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning that § 1915(g) treats prisoners like
“everyone else” is flawed because it ignores the extraordinarily lenient
treatment that non-prisoner in-forma-pauperis litigants receive in the federal
courts and how these litigants do not make any contributions towards
payment of their filing fees.81 It also ignores how prisoners lack the same
opportunities to earn and save funds as “everyone else.”82
Another rationale that several federal courts have offered in upholding
the constitutionality of the three-strikes bar is that it does not deprive
prisoners of the opportunity to file federal complaints or appeals—it simply
requires that they pay the entire filing fee upon commencement of an action
or appeal. Thus, prisoners need only “save up” and pay.83
Shortly after passage of the PLRA, the Ninth Circuit reasoned in
Rodriguez v. Cook:
Section 1915(g) does not prohibit prisoners from accessing the
courts to protect their rights. Inmates are still able to file claims—
they are only required to pay for filing those claims. In reaching
our conclusion, we recognize that some prisoners may be unable to
prepay filing fees, and will thereby be unable to bring their actions
immediately. However, non-prisoners face similar concerns [if
proceeding without in forma pauperis status]. Some prisoners will
be required to save money in order to prepay a filing fee and bring
a claim . . . . Section 1915(g) does require prisoners to be fiscally
responsible and make decisions concerning the merits of their
case. If inmates are unwilling to save their money and prepay

80
81
82
83

Kenney v. SSA ODAR Hearing, 640 F. App’x 803, 805–06 (10th Cir. 2016).
Carson, 112 F.3d at 821.
See infra Part IV.
Sanders v. Melvin, 873 F.3d 957, 959–60 (7th Cir. 2017).
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filing fees, such a decision may be a good indicator of the merits
of the case.84
In so ruling, the Ninth Circuit did not consider the possibility that inmates
may not be able to “save their money” to pay a filing fee—and that the size
of an inmate’s bank account and earning capacity may be the “indicators”
of whether an action can be brought—not a case’s merit.85
It bears noting that at the time of the Ninth Circuit’s 1999 decision in
Rodriguez, federal filing fees were considerably less than they are today. In
fact, the filing fee for a district court action at the time the PLRA was
enacted in 1996 was $150.86 Since then, the filing fee cost was increased to
$250 in 2004 and $350 in 2006.87 Thus, in ten years’ time, between 1996
and 2006, the cost of filing a federal action more than doubled.88 Despite
this significant increase, federal courts have continued to endorse the fiction
that inmates can “save up” if they wish to pursue litigation.
For example, in 2017 (when the docket fee for a district court action was
$350 plus a $50 administrative fee), the Seventh Circuit considered whether
a three-strikes litigant who had been in solitary confinement for eight years
(with another ten years of such confinement planned) because of
psychological diagnoses (“intermittent explosive disorder, schizoaffective
disorder, and other conditions”) could pursue his complaint.89 The plaintiff,
Cordell Sanders, asked the Seventh Circuit to consider whether his asthma
and psychological conditions constituted “imminent danger of serious

Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 1999).
Id.; see also infra Part IV (discussing constraints on prisoners’ ability to earn and save
income).
86 Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (1996). Filing fees have increased dramatically since the
passage of the Prison Litigation Reform Act in 1996. When the in forma pauperis statute
was codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1915 in 1948, the filing fee cost was $15 (and the fee for
filing a habeas corpus application was $5). 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (1948). By 1996, the fee
was $150. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (1996).
87 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (2004); 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (2006).
88 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (2004); 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (2006); see supra note 86.
89 Sanders v. Melvin, 873 F.3d 957, 959–60 (7th Cir. 2017).
84
85
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physical harm” to fall within the exception to the three-strikes rule.90 The
Court ruled that “psychological deterioration” is not “physical” and that
“[p]risoners facing long-term psychological problems can save up during
that long term and pay the filing fee.”91 However, the Seventh Circuit did
not consider whether it was possible for Sanders to “save up” the filing fee.
As explained below, by evaluating the district court record and the policies
of Illinois state prisons, it appears highly unlikely that Sanders could amass
$400 to pay a filing fee.
Sanders was confined in an Illinois state correctional facility and had
been convicted for murder.92 Under the Illinois Administrative Code, the
main work programs offered to state prisoners are the “Impact Incarceration
Program” and the “Work Release Program.”93 However, Sanders’ murder
conviction and mental health render him ineligible for both programs—
thus, contrary to the Seventh Circuit’s decision, he has no way of earning
and “sav[ing] up during th[e] long term” of his solitary confinement.94
Id.
Id. Sanders also claimed that he engaged in self-harm and attempted suicide twice; the
Seventh Circuit remarked that these claims were “self-serving,” but they did constitute a
“plausible allegation of imminent, serious physical harm,” and thus remanded the case
for further proceedings. Id. at 961–62.
92 Federal
Bureau of Prisons Inmate Locator, ILL. DEP’T OF CORR.,
https://www2.illinois.gov/idoc/Offender/Pages/InmateSearch.aspx (last visited July 14,
2020) (select IDOC number; then search text box for “R41346”; or, select Last Name;
then search text box for “Sanders, Cordell”) (listing his criminal history as including
“murder/intent to kill/injure,” for which he is serving twenty years of imprisonment); see
also Sanders, 873 F.3d at 959 (stating Sanders “has been in solitary confinement at
Pontiac Correctional Facility for eight years, and the prison plans to keep him there for
another ten” based on diagnoses for “intermittent explosive disorder, schizoaffective
disorder, and other conditions”).
93 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 460.12 (defining the “Impact Incarceration Program” as
including opportunities for “physical training and labor”; see also ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit.
20, § 455.30 (providing eligibility criteria for “Work Release Programs”).
94 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, §§ 460.20(c), (d), (f) (stating that, to be eligible for the
Impact Incarceration Program, which included “labor” assignments, a person could not
be convicted of first- or second-degree murder, could not be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of “more than 8 years,” and could “[n]ot have any mental disorder or
disability which would prevent participation in the program”); see also ILL. ADMIN.
90
91
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Additionally, a review of Sanders’ motion for in forma pauperis status filed
in the district court revealed that he had “zero” in his checking and savings
accounts and the only income he had recently received was a $10 gift from
a relative.95 Based on these details, it is highly improbable that Sanders
would be able to accumulate $400 for a filing fee within the two-year
statute of limitations for a deliberate indifference claim.96 Thus, for Sanders
to litigate his claims—no matter how meritorious they may be—he would
have to fall within the “imminent danger of serious physical injury”
exception.97
CODE tit. 20, § 455.30(a)(1) (stating that a person serving “a sentence for murder” is
ineligible for a “Work Release Program”); Sanders, 873 F.3d at 960.
95 Motion for In Forma Pauperis Status, doc. 3, Sanders v. Moss, No. 16-cv-1366 (C. D.
Ill. Oct. 18, 2019). Sanders’ claims—that the heat and “restricted air flow” in his cell
were exacerbating his asthma, and the extended period of solitary confinement was
“aggravating . . . his psychological problems”—have support in published case law. See,
e.g., Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993) (holding a prisoner could state an
Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to a serious medical need claim based on an
allegation that the prisoner’s cell was situated so that he was forced to breathe a
neighboring prisoner’s tobacco smoke and thus might suffer “serious damage to his
future health”); Duponte v. Wall, 288 F. Supp. 3d 504, 513 (D. R.I. 2018) (holding that
the plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim was “plausible” because “placement of
prisoners in solitary confinement poses a substantial risk of serious harm,” and it is
“‘well documented that . . . prolonged solitary confinement produces numerous
deleterious harms’” (quoting Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2765 (2015)). Sanders’
case was ultimately remanded to the district court to analyze whether Sanders’
allegations that he twice attempted suicide and had engaged in self-mutilation could
satisfy the “imminent danger” exception to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and thus allow Sanders’
complaint to proceed without prepayment of the entire filing fee. Sanders, 873 F.3d at
961.
96 Ruiz v. Williams, 144 F. Supp. 3d 1007, 1012 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 2015) (applying a
“two-year statute of limitations . . . to Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims”).
97 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (imminent danger exception). On remand, the district court
permitted Sanders to proceed under the “imminent danger” exception. Amended Merit
Review Order, doc. 34, Sanders v. Moss, No. 16-cv-1366 (C. D. Ill. Oct. 18, 2019).
Thereafter, Sanders was able to secure counsel (from the law firm Sidley Austin LLP and
the MacArthur Justice Center), and at the time this article was written, the case had
proceeded to the summary judgment stage. Notice of Appearance, doc. 59, Sanders v.
Moss, No. 16-cv-1366 (C. D. Ill. Oct. 18, 2019); Motion to Withdraw, doc. 75, Sanders
v. Moss, No. 16-cv-1366 (C. D. Ill. Oct. 18, 2019) (noting the continued representation
by Sidley Austin LLP and the MacArthur Justice Center); Summary Judgment Motion,
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While Sanders is a state prisoner who has no earning capacity and
negligible community resources, the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning could
apply to other prisoners who have secured paid employment and could
theoretically save their earnings. However, an examination of the limited
prison employment opportunities, paltry hourly wages, and considerable
constraints placed on prisoner bank accounts demonstrates that it is still
highly unlikely that many prisoners are able to save sufficient funds to
make a lump-sum payment of a filing fee.

IV. PRISONERS’ EARNING POWER AND SPENDING RESTRICTIONS
A. Overview
Because 28 U.S.C. § 1915 imposes a garnishment procedure on
prisoners, the filing of any complaint in forma pauperis is a costly
decision—the entire filing fee will gradually be paid.98 Thus, when a
doc. 184, Sanders v. Moss, No. 16-cv-1366 (C. D. Ill. Oct. 18, 2019). Considering that
the case has attracted counsel and has proceeded to the late stage of summary judgment,
it bears noting that this is not a case that lacks merits on its face—and is not the type of
case that the senators who proposed the PLRA expressed a desire to curb. During
Congressional hearings, Senator Dole stated that the PLRA was supposed to “put an end
to the inmate litigation fun-and-games.” 141 CONG. REC. 14,626 (1995) (statement of
Sen. Dole). Senator Reid also stated that it was supposed to keep courts from “spend[ing]
their time on this garbage [referring to frivolous cases].” 141 CONG. REC. 14,627 (1995)
(statement of Sen. Reid). However, senators also stated that they did “not want to prevent
inmates from raising legitimate claims” and assured that the PLRA would “not prevent
those claims from being raised.” 141 CONG. REC. 14,627 (1995) (statement of Sen.
Hatch). The case of Cordell Sanders shows the fine line that prisoners must walk. If
Sanders had not mentioned in his complaint that he had attempted suicide and had
engaged in self-mutilation—allegations the district court initially ignored in finding
Sanders barred under three-strikes rule—his colorable claims would never have received
a merits analysis due to Sanders’ indigency.
98 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) (requiring a person seeking in forma pauperis status
to file an affidavit including a statement of all assets and stating the person cannot pay
the filing fee), with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) (stating that, “[n]otwithstanding subsection
(a), if a prisoner brings a civil action or files an appeal in forma pauperis, the prisoner
shall be required to pay the full amount of a filing fee”) (emphasis added). Thus, under
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), non-prisoners merely have to file an affidavit stating they are
financially unable to pay the filing fee, and if a court grants in forma pauperis status, the
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prisoner has accumulated three “strikes” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), not
only is a prisoner obligated to pay an entirely new filing fee up-front ($400
for a district court action, or $500 for an appeal), but the prisoner is already
committed to making installment payments towards at least $1,200 in filing
fees (assuming that only three prior actions were filed in the district
courts).99 Further, as detailed below, if a prisoner has other financial
obligations—such as court fees from their criminal trial or appeal,
restitution, child support payments, alimony, student loans, outstanding tax
obligations, etc.—whatever money a prisoner may earn or receive is
typically earmarked to cover these expenses first.100
The main avenue for most prisoners to earn money would be to secure a
job within a prison. However, of the 2.3 million people incarcerated in U.S.
prisons (state and federal) in 2018, only “half of these inmates work.”101 Of
those who do work, if they are in “eight states—Alabama, Arkansas,
Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, Oklahoma, South Carolina and Texas—
[they] are not paid at all for their labor in government-run facilities.”102
Thus, more than half of all prisoners in the United States either cannot
obtain employment or cannot obtain paid employment. In other words, over
one million prisoners cannot earn money to pay filing fees.103

person can proceed with a civil action without paying the filing fees. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a)(1). Prisoners, by contrast, can move for in forma pauperis status and state in an
affidavit that they are indigent and cannot pay the filing fee, but prisoners are still
required to make payments towards the filing fee until the entire fee is paid. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(b)(1).
99 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
100 See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(a) (2020) (providing a list of payments, in their order of
priority, that federal prisoners are expected to make while incarcerated and after).
101 Daniel
Moritz-Rabson, ‘Prison Slavery’: Inmates Are Paid Cents While
Manufacturing Products Sold to Government, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 28, 2018),
https://www.newsweek.com/prison-slavery-who-benefits-cheap-inmate-labor-1093729
[https://perma.cc/VRD3-7B9T].
102 Id.
103 Id.
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Of those who are able to secure paid employment within a prison, their
hourly wages are shockingly meager. For example, the national average rate
of compensation for maintenance work performed by prisoners ranges from
$.14 to $.63 per hour.104 Between these notoriously low wages and the poor
conditions under which prisoners work, it is unsurprising that jobs in
correctional facilities are referred to as “prison slavery.”105
Because each state formulates its own prison regulations for state-run
facilities, each state can create unique limitations on the availability of
prison jobs, the salary range for these jobs, and the manner in which
prisoners’ funds are controlled. In order to provide a detailed and cohesive
analysis of these issues, this article focuses on the Federal Bureau of
Prisons.
B. Federal Policies and Regulations on Work and Prisoner Spending
The Bureau of Prisons provides work programs in areas including food
service, plumbing, painting, and groundskeeping, and federal prisoners
performing these jobs are paid anywhere between $.12 to $.40 per hour.106
But a job is not always available. Federal regulations provide a litany of
reasons for why a prisoner may not be eligible to work. A federal inmate
must be “physically and mentally able . . . to be assigned to an institutional,
industrial, or commissary work program.”107 Inmates participating in an
“education, vocational, or drug abuse treatment program, on either full or
part-time basis,” are typically exempt from seeking prison employment,
104 Id.

Minnesota and New Jersey offer the highest state hourly rate to prisoners
performing maintenance work within the prison: $2. Id. Higher wages are typically the
exception. For instance, 62,000 of the 2.3 million people incarcerated in the United States
have access to “correctional industries programs, producing manufactured goods” to be
sold—the hourly rate for these jobs run between $.33 to $1.41. Id.
105 Moritz-Rabson, supra note 101.
106 See
Work
Programs,
FED.
BUREAU
OF
PRISONS,
https://www.bop.gov/inmates/custody_and_care/work_programs.jsp
[https://perma.cc/D8LP-AXAT].
107 28 C.F.R. § 545.23(a) (1996).
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particularly if their involvement in these rehabilitative programs “is
mandated by Bureau policy or statute.”108 Some inmates may not be
considered for positions based on personal characteristics. Job assignments
are made upon consideration of an “inmate’s capacity to learn, interests,
requests, needs and eligibility, and the availability of the assignment(s).”109
Although jobs are unavailable to many, even assuming that a prisoner is
able to secure employment, the hourly wages are so minimal that it can take
over 1,000 hours of work to pay for a single filing fee.110 To put this burden
in perspective, the filing fees for two complaints and one appeal require
3,000 hours of work for a federal inmate earning the maximum of $.40 an
hour.111 For those only earning $.12 per hour, 8,750 hours of labor would
result in earnings of $1,050 (the total filing fees for three district court
actions if in forma pauperis status was granted for the three actions).112 And
these calculations assume that a prisoner pays no other expenses or
financial obligations.
To this end, many prisoners are not able to keep all that they earn.
Federal prisoners who have any outstanding financial obligations are
expected to repay them.113 Every federal judgment in a criminal case details
“criminal monetary penalties” that may include court assessments,
restitution, fines, an “Amy, Vicky, and an Andy Child Pornography Victim
Assistance Act of 2018” (“AAVA”) assessment, and/or a “Justice for
Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015” (“JVTA”) assessment.114 A federal
108 Id.

Beyond required rehabilitation via educational and treatment programs, an inmate
can be excluded from a work program if the inmate voluntarily wishes to enroll in an
educational or treatment opportunity and obtains the relevant Warden’s permission. Id.
109 28 C.F.R. § 545.23(d) (1996).
110 At $.12 per hour, it would take an inmate 3,334 hours of work to earn $400 for a
district court filing fee. See supra notes 97, 104 and accompanying text.
111 See supra note 106.
112 Id.; see supra note 17.
113 28 C.F.R. § 545.11 (1999).
114 Form, Judgment in a Criminal Case, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS. at Sheet 5,
https://www.uscourts.gov/forms/criminal-judgment-forms/judgment-criminal-case
[https://perma.cc/D36N-ZAY6].
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judge may also require a defendant to pay interest on any restitution or fines
totaling over $2,500, to cover the cost of prosecution, and/or to pay specific
court costs.115 Although a federal judge may “expressly order[] otherwise,”
the default is for “payment of criminal penalties . . . during the period of
imprisonment.”116 According to the standard language of the federal
criminal judgment template, “Payments shall be applied in the following
order: (1) assessment, (2) restitution principal, (3) restitution interest, (4)
AVAA assessment, (5) fine principal, (6) fine interest, (7) community
restitution, (8) JVTA assessment, (9) penalties, and (10) costs, including
cost of prosecution and court costs.”117
While each criminal sentence is unique, there are certain financial
obligations that typically arise. A special assessment is required “on any
person convicted of an offense against the United States.”118 While a
mandatory special assessment can be as little as $5 for a class C
misdemeanor, it can be as high as $100 for a felony.119
Restitution is another common monetary penalty. Whether restitution is
discretionary, mandatory, or unnecessary depends on the nature of the
crime committed.120 For example, judges have discretion to order restitution
when a defendant has been convicted of violating the Controlled Substance
Act—such as by manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with the intent
to manufacture or distribute a controlled substance.121 Such restitution can
address damage or loss to property, bodily injury to a victim, death of a
115 Id.;
116 Id.
117 Id.

see also id. at Sheet 6.
at Sheet 6.

118 18

U.S.C. § 3013(a).
18 U.S.C. § 3013(a)(1)(A)(i) (listing assessments for various misdemeanor
convictions), with 18 U.S.C. § 3013(a)(2)(A) (listing assessments for felonies).
120 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3663 (discretionary restitution), with 18 U.S.C. § 3663A
(mandatory restitution).
121 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(A) (stating that the “court, when sentencing a defendant
convicted of an offense under [various provisions] of the Controlled Substances Act . . .
may order . . . that the defendant make restitution to any victim of such offense, or if the
victim is deceased, to the victim’s estate”).
119 Compare
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victim, or a victim’s lost income, among other things.122 Restitution is a
mandatory component of a criminal sentence when a person is convicted of
an offense that is a “crime of violence,” an “offense against property . . .
including any offense committed by fraud or deceit,” or a crime involving
tampering with consumer products.123 Between the mandatory special
assessment and the wide range of crimes for which restitution can be owed,
indigent federal prisoners may begin serving a term of imprisonment with
significant financial debts hanging over their heads. According to the Office
of the Inspector General, more than half of the Bureau of Prisons’ “total
inmate population . . . have financial obligations.”124
Because payment of the special assessment, restitution, and a host of
other possible costs and fees are supposed to begin while a federal prisoner
is incarcerated, the Federal Bureau of Prisons operates an “Inmate Financial
Responsibility Program” (“IFRP”).125 The purpose of the IFRP “is to
encourage federal offenders to voluntarily pay their court-ordered financial
obligations while incarcerated in [Bureau of Prisons] institutions.”126 Upon
entry into a Bureau of Prisons facility, an “initial classification” is
conducted to assess an inmate’s liabilities and their ability to pay
outstanding financial obligations.127 These obligations include both those

122 18

U.S.C. §§ 3663(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(4).
U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1)(A).
124 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
PRISONS’ INMATE FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY PROGRAM, REP. NO. I-2000-023 (2000),
https://oig.justice.gov/reports/BOP/e0023/intro.htm [https://perma.cc/27BG-N3R8].
125 ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., supra note 114, at Sheet 6 (“Unless the court has
expressly ordered otherwise, if this judgment imposes imprisonment, payment of
criminal monetary penalties is due during the period of imprisonment.”); see also U.S.
DEP’T OF JUST. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 124.
126 ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., supra note 114, at Sheet 6; see also U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 124.
127 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., PROGRAM STATEMENT, NO. 5380.07, at 4 (2000),
https://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5380_007.pdf [https://perma.cc/J4PA-6FZC].
123 18
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flowing from the criminal judgment and non-criminal financial
responsibilities (such as child support or alimony).128
Federal regulations specify the “priority order” in which an inmate’s
financial debts must be paid.129 First, an inmate must pay any special
assessments imposed at sentencing, which typically amount to $100 or
less.130 Second, an inmate’s funds are allocated for payment of any “[c]ourtordered restriction,” such as restitution.”131 Third, payments are taken from
an inmate’s funds to pay “[f]ines and court costs.”132 Fourth, an inmate
must pay “[s]tate or local court obligations,” 133 which can include courtordered child support or alimony.134 Lastly, an inmate must make financial
contributions to any other “federal government obligations,” which
encompasses a range of debts—from “student loans, Veterans
Administration claims, tax liabilities, Freedom of Information/Privacy Act
fees, etc.”135
Some inmates do not join the IFRP because they have “no documented
financial obligation,” they are exempt from participating because of
“medical or psychological restrictions that prevent the inmates from
working,” or they refuse to do so.136 A refusal to join, however, invites a
128 Id.

at 5 (explaining that “state or local court obligations” include things such as child
support payments or alimony).
129 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(a) (1999).
130 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(a)(1) (1999); 18 U.S.C. § 3013(a). The need to make payments
towards the special assessment ends five years after the date of the judgment. 18 U.S.C. §
3013(c). However, by the time the five years elapse, a prisoner’s account has likely
already been depleted making minimum payments or it may never have had enough
funds to begin paying the special assessment fee.
131 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(a)(2) (1999). “A defendant’s obligation to pay restitution ceases
20 years after the inmate’s release from incarceration for inmates convicted on or after
April 24, 1996.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 127. However, when a prisoner is
incarcerated—and is in an extremely disadvantageous position to earn meaningful wages
for repayment—payments towards restitution are required. Id.
132 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(a)(3) (1999).
133 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(a)(4) (1999).
134 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 127, at 5.
135 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(a)(5) (1999); U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 127, at 5–6.
136 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 124.
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host of adverse consequences.137 These include notification to the Parole
Commission of the inmate’s failure, ineligibility for an increase in pay, loss
of a prison job, imposition of a “monthly commissary spending limitation,”
placement in quarters of “the lowest housing status,” and ineligibility for
placement in a “community-based program.”138 Thus, for federal prisoners,
unless exempt, there is little choice but to partake in the IFRP and comply
with the payment schedule for outstanding financial obligations. By
participating, however, an inmate loses control over the funds in their
inmate trust account. Upon a prisoner’s decision to participate in the IFRP,
a contract is signed that states the prisoner agrees to make “payments
towards his or her financial obligations.”139
An IFRP plan typically abides by a certain formula. To determine an
installment schedule and amount for each installment, a member of an
institution’s IFRP unit team assesses the “total funds deposited into the
inmate’s trust fund account for the previous six months,” deducts IFRP
payments made during the preceding six months, and subtracts an
assessment of $75 per month (if this money exists) for funds to be
transferred to the Inmate Telephone System.140 In determining the
installment amount for the IFRP, the IFRP staff considers funds in the
inmate’s trust account and phone credit account, and if they determine the
amount in a phone credit account to be “surplus,” the inmate is “encouraged

137 28

C.F.R. § 545.11(d) (1999) (listing ten effects for failing to participate in the
financial responsibility program and make requisite payments, and for failing to comply
with a financial plan once one is created for a specific inmate).
138 Id. This regulation consistently uses the acronym “UNICOR” without defining it.
“UNICOR is the trade name of Federal Prison Industries, Inc., a self-sustaining
government corporation that provides employment and job training to [Bureau of
Prisons] inmates while producing marketable goods and services.” United States v.
Lemoine, 546 F.3d 1042, 1047 n.3 (9th Cir. 2008).
139 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 127, at 14.
140 Id. at 6–7.
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to refrain from additional deposits to the phone credit account to
accommodate the new IFRP payments.”141
Most IFRP plans require an inmate to make a minimum payment each
month or quarter; the amount of each payment depends on whether an
inmate has a job with the Federal Prison Industries, Inc., and, if so, the
“grade” assigned to the inmate’s work.142 The majority of inmates with
prison jobs “ordinarily will be expected to allot not less than 50% of their
monthly pay to the payment process.”143 Thus, the paltry salaries that
federal prisoners earn are essentially cut in half because of the payments
they must make under their “financial plans.”144 When an inmate makes less
than $.46 per hour, the minimum IFRP payment is no longer 50% of the
inmate’s earnings, it is a flat fee of $25 per quarter.145 According to the
Zoukis Consulting Group, a firm that specializes in helping new prisoners
acclimate to life in federal prisons, “most prisoners only make $10 to $20
per month, which is hardly enough to buy commissary items, call home,
buy songs for their MP3 players, or email home.”146 Assuming these figures
are correct, if a prisoner earns $10 per month, that would equal $30 per
quarter; to then make a minimum payment of $25 per quarter would leave
the prisoner with $5 per quarter to save towards a future filing fee. At the
rate of saving $5 per month, it would take eighty months, or six years and
eight months, to save $400—at which time the statute of limitations for
most, if not all, claims would have expired.147 Thus it appears that most
141 Id.

at 7.
C.F.R. § 545.11(b) (1999).
143 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(b)(2) (1999).
144 Id.
145 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 124, at tbl.1.
146 Inmate
Work
Assignments,
ZOUKIS
CONSULTING,
https://www.prisonerresource.com/prison-life/things-to-do-in-prison/inmate-workassignments/ [https://perma.cc/US5K-FKQJ].
147 Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275 (1985) (holding that it is up to each state to
identify the “most applicable statute of limitations for all § 1983 claims”); see also Battle
v. Ledford, 912 F.3d 708, 713 (4th Cir. 2019) (“The Supreme Court has directed that we
apply a state’s ‘statute of limitations governing general personal injury actions’ when
142 28
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prisoners in the IFRP program would have an extremely difficult time in
saving their institutional funds and prepaying a filing fee before expiration
of a statute of limitations. Such prisoners would lose the opportunity to
litigate a claim—not because the claim lacked merit, but because the
prisoner lacked money.148
Another source of possible funds are “community” resources from
friends and family members. However, a 2015 study found that “[n]early 2
in 3 families (65% ) with an incarcerated member were unable to meet their
family’s basic needs,” that “[i]n 63% of cases, family members on the
outside were primarily responsible for court-related costs associated with
conviction,” and that the “average debt incurred for court-related fines and
fees [in the underlying criminal proceedings] alone was $13,607.”149 Thus,
for the majority of prisoners, seeking funds from family to pay a filing fee
is not feasible.150
In conclusion, an analysis of prisoners in federal custody demonstrates
that it is no easy feat for a prisoner to earn income and earmark it for
payment of a future filing fee. As of 2000, approximately 20,000 federal
prisoners with financial obligations were enrolled in the IFRP and were
contractually obligated to make payments towards pre-existing specified
expenses.151 For prisoners enrolled in the IFRP, money is automatically
considering § 1983 claims.”) (quoting Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 251 (1989)). Some
states, like Virginia, “give[] a plaintiff only one year to assert his rights, plus
exhaustion.” Ledford, 912 F.3d at 713. For a federal inmate to save $400 within one
year—while satisfying whatever other financial obligations may be placed on the funds
in their prisoner trust account and earning cents per hour—would be a feat.
148 Even if a prisoner receives “community” resources—funds from family or friends that
can be deposited into the prisoner’s trust account—this money is not immune; IFRP
“[p]ayments may be made from institution resources or non-institution (community)
resources. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 127, at 6.
149 SANETA DEVUONO-POWELL ET AL., WHO PAYS? THE TRUE COST OF INCARCERATION
ON
FAMILIES
12–13
(2015),
http://whopaysreport.org/who-pays-full-report/
[https://perma.cc/2B2G-W5LZ].
150 Id.
151 According to a 2000 report produced by the U.S. Department of Justice Office of the
Inspector General, “[o]ver one-half (approximately 83,000) of BOP’s total inmate
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deducted from their accounts periodically (usually quarterly), and thus they
cannot “save up” funds for payment of a new filing fee.152
When indigent three-strikes prisoners wish to file nonfrivolous litigation
but lack an ability to earn and save $400 to $500 within a statute of
limitations period, it is hard to understand how their right to “access the
courts” under the First Amendment is not violated by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

V. “ACCESS TO THE COURTS”
The constitutional right to access the courts is typically grounded in the
First Amendment’s guarantee that Congress “shall make no law . . .
abridging . . . the right of the people . . . to petition the government for a
redress of grievances.”153 However, courts have also linked access claims to
other sources. As the Eleventh Circuit has stated, “[a]ccess to the courts is
clearly a constitutional right, grounded in the First Amendment, the Article
IV Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Fifth Amendment, and/or the
Fourteenth Amendment.”154 However, each of these sources of
constitutional authority brings its own legal standards, and some courts
have struggled to analyze prisoner access-to-the-courts claims with any

population (approximately 147,000) have financial obligations. Of those inmates with
obligations, about one forth (approximately 20,000) are participating in the IFRP and
making payments.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 124. There
is a dearth of public records that provide statistics on the number of federal prisoners who
are currently enrolled in the IFRP and are making payments. However, even assuming
the proportion of prisoners participating in the IFRP has not changed, it is significant that
20,000 prisoners may not be able to save their wages to pay a new filing fee. Id.
152 If a prisoner with an IFRP plan decided to cease making payments under the plan to
“save up,” the prisoner risks losing their prison job, which may be their only reliable
source of income. 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(d)(4), (5) (1999). Thus, it is no exaggeration to
state that a prisoner with an IFRP plan cannot “save up,” or earmark money in their own
trust account, for payment of a future filing fee.
153 U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Bill Johnson’s Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731,
741 (1983) (reaffirming that “the right of access to the courts is an aspect of the First
Amendment right to petition the Government for redress of grievances”).
154 Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1282 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Christopher v.
Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415, n.12 (2002) (collecting cases).
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specificity.155 A review of Supreme Court cases over the past several
decades clarifies what a prisoner must allege to demonstrate a loss of access
to the courts. These cases demonstrate that a prisoner who lacks funds to
prepay a filing fee to litigate a nonfrivolous claim can allege the denial of
access to the courts.
In 1974, the Supreme Court considered the case of Wolff v. McDonnell,
in which a Nebraska state prisoner, Robert McDonnell, sought to challenge
the “inmate legal assistance program” at his prison through a 42 U.S.C. §
1983 complaint.156 Previously, the Supreme Court had ruled that prisoners
were entitled to assistance in the preparation of their habeas corpus
petitions, and McDonnell argued for the extension of this holding to civil
rights proceedings.157 The Supreme Court sided with McDonnell, holding
“[t]he right of access to the courts . . . is founded in the Due Process Clause
and assures that no person will be denied the opportunity to present to the

155 For

example, in Lewis v. Sullivan, after a district court judge ruled that § 1915(g)
could be unconstitutional unless judges are permitted to “dispense with prepayment
whenever, in their discretion, they viewed the prisoners’ claims to be substantial, the
United States “intervened to defend the constitutionality of § 1915(g)” via an
interlocutory appeal to the Seventh Circuit. Lewis v. Sullivan, 279 F.3d 526, 527 (7th
Cir. 2002). However, it seems the United States may not have identified under what
precise constitutional theory the statute was constitutional. Id. Accordingly, the Seventh
Circuit collected cases from other Circuits ranging from challenges based on “the due
process right of access to the courts, the equal protection clause, the ex post facto clause,
the first amendment right to petition for redress of grievances, and several others.” Id. at
528. The Seventh Circuit then reasoned that because all “seven decisions have held that §
1915(g) is constitutional,” and these “decisions [were] sound,” a constitutional challenge
to § 1915(g) could not stand. Id.
156 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 542 (1974).
157 Id. at 578–79. As described in McDonnell,
In Johnson v. Avery, an inmate was disciplined for violating a prison
regulation which prohibited inmates from assisting other prisoners in preparing
habeas corpus petitions. The Court held that ‘unless and until the State
provides some reasonable alternative to assist inmates in the preparation of
petitions for post-conviction relief,’ inmates could not be barred from
furnishing assistance to each other.
Id. at 578 (quoting Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 490 (1969)).
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judiciary allegations of violations of fundamental constitutional rights.”158
As to whether there was a distinction between habeas corpus and civil
rights cases insofar as access to the courts was concerned, the Supreme
Court held that there was “no reasonable distinction between the two forms
of action.”159 Rather, the Court noted that the two actions sometimes
redressed violation of the “the same constitutional rights,” and that civil
rights actions were as essential as habeas corpus because “both actions
serve to protect basic constitutional rights.”160 The Court went so far as to
state that “[i]t is futile to contend that the Civil Rights Act of 1871 has less
importance in our constitutional scheme than does the Great Writ.”161
The comparison between prisoner civil rights actions and habeas corpus
in McDonnell is significant given the Supreme Court’s prior reluctance to
address whether a filing fee waiver for indigent prisoners was appropriate in
cases other than criminal proceedings or habeas corpus actions.162 For
158 Id.

at 579.
at 580.
160 Id. at 579 (“the demarcation line between civil rights actions and habeas petitions is
not always clear. The Court has already recognized instances where the same
constitutional rights might be redressed under either form of relief,” and “while it is true
that only in habeas actions may relief be granted which would shorten the term of
confinement, . . . it is more pertinent that both actions serve to protect basic constitutional
rights.”).
161 Id. McDonnell went on to state that “The recognition by this Court that prisoners have
certain constitutional rights which can be protected by civil rights actions would be
diluted if inmates . . . were unable to articulate their complaints to the courts.” Id. While
McDonnell was considering the need for prisons provide assistance to inmates who were
“totally or functionally illiterate” with the preparation of legal papers, the point that
McDonnell seems to harp on is that prisoners must have the chance to seek protection of
their constitutional rights by having the ability to present their claims in court. Id.
162 Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 257–58 (1959) (ruling that fee waivers for indigent
prisoners was appropriate for direct criminal appeals); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708
(1961) (analyzing a habeas petitioner’s challenge to the imposition of a filing fee and
holding that “to interpose any financial consideration between an indigent prisoner of the
State and his exercise of a state right to sue for his liberty is to deny prisoners the equal
protection of the laws”). The Supreme Court has recognized the same principle in direct
criminal appeals. Burns, 360 U.S. at 257 (holding that the “imposition by the State of
financial barriers restricting the availability of appellate review for indigent criminal
defendants has no place in our heritage of Equal Justice Under Law”).
159 Id.
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example, in Smith v. Bennett, the Supreme Court acknowledged that a
prisoner’s ability to bring a habeas corpus petition—a “civil action for
procedural purposes”—could not be withheld because “an indigent prisoner
[could not make] payment of a filing fee.”163 The Bennett Court was careful
to limit the extension of its holding, noting that waiving a filing fee for an
indigent litigant’s habeas corpus petition “does not necessarily mean that . .
. other actions involving civil rights must be on the same footing.”164
McDonnell, however, explicitly placed civil rights complaints on the “same
footing” as habeas corpus actions for purposes of access to the courts
claims by stating that “no person will be denied the opportunity to present
. . . violations of fundamental constitutional rights,” and that the Civil
Rights Act of 1871—the precursor to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the statute that
enables prisoners to assert violation of their constitutional rights—has no
“less importance in our constitutional scheme” than habeas corpus.165
In 1977, the Supreme Court heard arguments in Bounds v. Smith, which
raised the issue of whether prisoners’ right to access the courts was violated
based on an inadequate prison law library.166 The Supreme Court held that
it was “indisputable that indigent inmates must be provided at state expense
with paper and pen to draft legal documents, with notarial services to
authenticate them, and with stamps to mail them.”167 It went so far as to rule
that “[s]tates must forgo collection of docket fees otherwise payable to the
treasury and expend funds for transcripts,” and cautioned that while

163 Bennett,

365 U.S. at 712. While the filing fee for a habeas corpus action was only $4
at the time Bennett was decided (it is $5 in the year 2020), the Supreme Court remarked
that although $4 was a nominal sum, “if one does not have it and is unable to get it the
fee might as well be $400.” Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (2020) (“on [an] application
for a writ of habeas corpus the filing fee shall be $5). Ironically, the filing fee for a
federal civil rights complaint is $400 in 2020—a sum that is certainly not “nominal”
when compared to the few dollars needed for the habeas corpus filing fee. Id.
164 Bennett, 365 U.S. at 713.
165 McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 579.
166 Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 824–25 (1977).
167 Id. at 828.
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“economic factors may . . . be considered,” “the cost of protecting a
constitutional right cannot justify its total denial.”168 If states must “forgo
collection of docket fees” to protect “a constitutional right,” why should the
same principle not apply to federal court docket fees?169 Whether it is to
buy law books, pay the salary of a legal assistant, purchase necessary
transcripts, or pay the price of materials needed for a prisoner’s legal papers
(stamps, photocopies, transcripts etc.), the Supreme Court has held that
such actions are “require[d]” by “the fundamental constitutional right of

168 Id.

at 823, 825. Since Bounds involved the discrete issue of the adequacy of a prison
law library, it is arguable that it is dicta when the Court stated that docket fees should go
uncollected to protect a “constitutional right.” Id. However, this still provides a
persuasive basis for the argument that the collection of court docket fees should not bar a
prisoner from raising a claim that his or her constitutional rights have been violated. Id.
Another counterargument that could be raised is that the cases cited in Bounds in
support of the waiver of docket fees involved attacks on criminal convictions (via direct
appeal or habeas corpus)—and not civil rights cases. Id.; see Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S.
252, 257–58 (1959) (ruling that the state of Ohio could not prohibit a criminal defendant
from filing a motion for leave to appeal on the basis that the defendant could not afford to
pay a filing fee for the motion); Bennett, 365 U.S. at 708 (determining that fee waiver for
habeas petitioners must be waived for indigent criminal defendants and that “financial
hurdles must not be permitted to condition its exercise”). The Bennett Court specified
that its holding was narrow and that it was speaking about habeas—which are
procedurally civil, and not criminal, proceedings—fees. Id. at 712–13 (“To require the
State to docket applications for the post-conviction remedy of habeas corpus by indigent
prisoners without the fee payments does not necessarily mean that all habeas corpus or
other actions involving civil rights must be on the same footing. Only those involving
indigent convicted prisoners are involved here and we pass only on them). However, the
Supreme Court in Wolff v. McDonnell took this principle a step further and equated
habeas cases to prisoner civil rights actions. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579
(1974).
169 While 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) memorializes that a prisoner’s lack of funds should not
prevent the filing of a federal action in forma pauperis (and thus trigger the garnishment
of funds from that prisoner’s trust account should any funds become available), no such
safeguard exists for a meritorious complaint alleging constitutional violations by a
penniless prisoner who has accumulated three “strikes.” Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4)
(allowing a prisoner to file a complaint or appeal in forma pauperis despite evidence that
the entire filing fee will never be paid), with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (establishing a bar for
the duration of a prisoner’s sentence once a prisoner has accumulated three “strike”
dismissals and requiring the three-strikes litigant to pay an entire filing fee as a lump sum
before commencing another action or appeal).
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access to the courts.”170 By extension, the waiver of the lump-sum
prepayment of a federal filing fee for a three-strikes litigant who cannot
make such a payment is a necessary measure to provide access to the courts
for nonfrivolous complaints.171 Without such a waiver, no matter how
meritorious a complaint may be, an indigent three-strikes litigant’s failure
to prepay the entire filing fee would bar the prisoner’s ability to protect
“fundamental constitutional rights.”172
Nearly twenty years after Bounds, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the right
of access to courts in the civil rights arena.173 In Lewis v. Casey, the
Supreme Court explained that an access-to-the-courts claim required
allegations of “actual injury”—that “a nonfrivolous legal claim had been
frustrated or was being impeded.”174 To that end, “the injury requirement is
not satisfied by just any type of frustrated legal claim”; rather, inmates
challenging their direct appeals from conviction, filing habeas petitions, and

170 Bounds,

430 U.S. 825, 828 (“We hold, therefore, that the fundamental constitutional
right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation
and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with law libraries or
adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.”).
171 This principle has been recognized in other contexts. For example, in an action to tax
costs against a prisoner in a civil rights case, the Eastern District of California stated that
“[p]rison civil rights suits are matters of substantial public importance,” and that,
“[b]ecause the majority of prisoners are indigent, their access to the courts on potentially
meritorious claims must not be compromised by their fear of incurring costs should they
not prevail.” Barker v. Yassine, No. 2:11-cv-00246, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174453, *3
(E.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2016). Should not the same rationale apply to prisoner litigation for
purposes of the three strikes rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)?
172 McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 579.
173 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996). In Lewis, twenty-two inmates sued the Arizona
Department of Corrections (“ADOC”), alleging that they had been deprived of “adequate
law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.” Id. at 346.
Specifically, there were inmates who were kept in “lockdown” confinement and were
“‘routinely denied physical access to the law library’ and ‘experience[d] severe
interference with their access to the courts,’” while there were other inmates who were
“illiterate or non-English-speaking . . . who d[id] not receive adequate legal assistance.”
Id. at 346–47. The district court ordered systemwide change, and the ADOC defendants
challenged the scope of this state-wide mandate on appeal. Id.
174 Id. at 351–52 (discussing actual injury).
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“‘civil rights actions’—i.e., actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to vindicate
‘basic constitutional rights’”—could raise successful access to the courts
claims.175 Thus, Lewis reinforces the argument that nonfrivolous prisoner
civil rights cases should not be barred from review under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(g) simply because a prisoner cannot amass $400 or $500 for a filing
fee.176
The most recent Supreme Court case to address prisoner access-to-thecourts claims was in 2002, in Christopher v. Harbury.177 To begin, the
Court acknowledged that “the basis of the constitutional right of access to
courts” is “unsettled,” and that its “prior cases on denial of access to courts
have not extended over the entire range of claims that have been brought
under that general rubric.”178 After considering the various types of access
claims that the Courts of Appeals had encountered—ranging from prisonlitigation cases to actions asserting the loss of an opportunity to sue because

175 Id.

at 354–55.
Just as 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) provides an avenue for relief for indigent prisoners
who lack the means to begin paying a filing fee under the statute’s garnishment
procedure, some avenue—whether it be by court recognition that not all indigent threestrikes prisoners can save hundreds of dollars to pay a filing fee, or Congressional
amendment of the PLRA—must be paved so that three-strikes litigants are not barred
from bringing nonfrivolous lawsuits simply because of an inability to pay a lump-sum
filing fee.
177 Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 405 (2002) (explaining that the basis of the
access to the courts claim was that U.S. Government officials “intentionally deceived
[the respondent-plaintiff] in concealing information that her husband, a foreign dissident,
was being detained and tortured in his own country by military officers of his
government,” and that this “official deception denied respondent access to the courts by
leaving her without information, or reason to seek information, with which she could
have brought a lawsuit that might have saved her husband’s life”).
178 Id. at 415, 412–13. In Harbury, the Supreme Court explained that there are two main
types of access to the courts claims: (1) “claims that systematic official action frustrates a
plaintiff or plaintiff class in preparing and filing suits at the present time”; and (2)
“claims not in aid of a class of suits yet to be litigated, but of specific cases that cannot
now be tried.” Id. at 412–14. The type of access to the courts claim this article considers
falls within the second category—as the Supreme Court explained in Harbury, a person
can be denied access to the courts when “specific litigation . . . could not have
commenced.” Id. at 414.
176 Id.
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officials withheld evidence—the Supreme Court stated that access claims
generally fall within one of two categories.179 The first category involved
“claims that systemic official action frustrates a plaintiff or plaintiff class in
preparing and filing suits at the present time.”180 In illustrating the types of
cases that fall within this category, the Supreme Court cited prisoner civil
rights claims alleging the deprivation of an adequate prison law library, the
need to provide a “reader” to an “illiterate prisoner” preparing legal papers,
and the need for appointment of counsel.181 The Court also specifically
mentioned “denial-of-access cases challenging filing fees that poor
plaintiffs cannot afford to pay, [in which] the object is an order requiring
waiver of a fee to open the courthouse door for desired litigation, such as
direct appeals or federal habeas petitions in criminal cases, or civil suits
asserting family-law rights.”182 In such cases, “the essence of the access
claim is that official action is presently denying an opportunity to litigate,”
and the “opportunity has not been lost for all time, however, but only in the
short term.”183 Hence, “the object of the denial-of-access suit, and the
justification for recognizing that claim, is to place the plaintiff in a position

179 Id.
180 Id.

at 413.

181 Id.
182 Id.

(citing cases that illustrate the specific fact patterns and procedural postures
described in the text). While the Supreme Court explicitly stated that it was
“consider[ing] examples” of access cases, id. at 412–13 (emphasis added), some federal
courts considering the constitutionality of § 1915(g) have connected the waiver of filing
fees to the preservation of fundamental rights, and have insisted the fundamental rights
exist in criminal, habeas, or family law cases. Rivera v. Allin, 144. F.3d 719, 723 (11th
Cir. 1998). The Supreme Court has mandated waivers of filing fees in civil cases only
where “the litigant has a ‘fundamental interest at stake’” . . . . The Fifth Circuit,
collecting cases, outlined the boundaries: “Examples of proceedings that implicate
fundamental
interests
are
divorce
actions
. . . and terminations of parental rights.” Id. (quoting Carson v. Johnson, 112 F.3d 818,
821 (5th Cir. 1997)). Rivera concluded that a prisoner’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint
alleging an Eighth Amendment violation did not involve a “fundamental interest,” and
thus the prisoner’s access-to-the-courts claim was denied. Rivera, 144 F.3d at 723–24.
183 Harbury, 536 U.S. at 413.
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to pursue a separate claim for relief once the frustrating condition has been
removed.”184
A prisoner subject to the three-strikes bar of § 1915(g) who is unable to
pay the entire filing fee upon submission of a complaint needs an avenue to
request the removal of the “frustrating condition” of § 1915(g)’s lump-sum
fee requirement. A “denial-of-access” suit, as described in Wolff v.
McDonnell, Bounds v. Smith, Lewis v. Casey, and Christopher v. Harbury,
is the path an indigent prisoner should take to challenge the application of §
1915(g) when this statute bars an otherwise non-frivolous complaint.185
However, how can a three-strikes prisoner who cannot afford to pay a
lump-sum filing fee commence an action alleging the denial of access to the
courts?

VI. THE NEED TO AMEND OR REPEAL § 1915(G)
The Supreme Court has stated that “[i]n denial-of-access cases
challenging filing fees that poor plaintiffs cannot afford to pay, the object is
an order requiring waiver of a fee to open the courthouse door for desired
litigation.”186 However, when a three-strikes litigant needs to raise a denialof-access claim, the prisoner must overcome the very obstacle the lawsuit
challenges: payment of the filing fee. In other words, to file an access-tothe-courts
claim
challenging
§ 1915(g), a three-strikes prisoner would have to pay the $400 lump-sum

184 Id.

The second category of access cases identified in Harbury involve cases “that
cannot now be tried (or tried with all material evidence), no matter what official action
may be in the future.” Id. Thus, the main difference between the two categories of access
cases is that one class of cases that requires removal of a state-created obstacle so that the
underlying lawsuit may proceed, while the other involves a lost opportunity to bring an
underlying lawsuit. Id.
185 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977);
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996); Harbury, 536 U.S. at 403.
186 Harbury, 536 U.S. at 414.
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filing fee that the prisoner is alleging they are unable to pay.187 A prisoner
can thus be denied access to the courts to challenge the denial of access to
the courts.188
Yet, the denial of access to the federal courts does not seem to
correspond with the legislative intent expressed during congressional
debates over the PLRA. The bill’s sponsors repeatedly assured that the new
restrictions governing prisoners would not block nonfrivolous lawsuits.
When the bill was first introduced to the Senate, Senator Bob Dole
described it as a proposal for “several important reforms that would
dramatically reduce the number of meritless prisoner lawsuits.”189 Days
later, co-sponsor Senator Orrin Hatch stated, “I do not want to prevent
inmates from raising legitimate claims. This legislation will not prevent
those claims from being raised.”190 Another co-sponsor, Strom Thurmond,
added that “[t]his amendment will allow meritorious claims to be filed, but

187 28

U.S.C. § 1915(g) (requiring a prisoner to prepay filing fees before filing an action
once three strikes have been accumulated, unless the prisoner alleged “imminent danger
of serious physical injury). Of course, a denial of access-to-the-courts claim has nothing
to do with “physical injury,” and thus it could not possibly fall within the exception to the
lump-sum collection of the filing fee prescribed by § 1915(g).
188 The Seventh Circuit has suggested that § 1915(g) poses no access to the courts
violation because an indigent prisoner barred from filing a federal complaint without
prepaying the filing fee could simply file a complaint in state court. Lewis v. Sullivan,
279 F.3d 526, 530 (7th Cir. 2002) (“A prisoner who suffers a threat to (or deprivation of)
fundamental rights has ready access to the courts,” and could “[s]ue in state court rather
than federal court—for § 1915(g) does not apply in state court, and states must entertain
§ 1983 litigation on a parity with claims under state law.”). However, the Seventh Circuit
overlooks how several states have adopted nearly identical “three strikes” rules, and
therefore prisoners may not be able to seek recourse in state courts without prepaying
state court filing fees as well. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-68-607(b) (West 2017)
(Arkansas three strikes rule); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-3401(2)(a) (West 2018)
(Nebraska three strikes rule); PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. § 6602(f) (West 1998)
(Pennsylvania three strikes rule); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 801.02(7)(d) (West 2015)
(Wisconsin three strikes rule).
189 152 CONG. REC. 14,413 (1995) (statement of Sen. Dole) (emphasis added).
190 141 CONG. REC. 27,042 (1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
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gives the judge broader discretion to prevent frivolous and malicious
lawsuits filed by prison inmates.”191
Yet, § 1915(g) allots no discretion to judges to evaluate the merits of a
prisoner’s lawsuit—it requires automatic dismissal if a prisoner has three
strikes and does not pay the entire filing fee.192 Unless a prisoner can
establish “imminent danger of serious physical injury,” the statute states
that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal” once three
strikes have been accumulated.193 Thus, meritorious lawsuits can be
dismissed simply because a prisoner cannot pay a lump-sum fee.
This article argues that § 1915(g) needs to be amended to ensure that
indigent prisoners are not deprived of the opportunity to file a meritorious
lawsuit. Some prisoners may be able to earn money from prison
employment without having all or most of it garnished to repay restitution,
child support, alimony, student loans, or other financial obligations.194
Other prisoners may have community resources—family members or
friends who can provide funds for payment of a filing fee. However, as
detailed in Part IV, half of all U.S. prisoners are not able to obtain prison
employment and thus cannot earn money while in prison, and the majority
of prisoners’ families are saddled with debt from costs related to both the
prisoner’s criminal conviction as well as the loss of whatever income the
prisoner had earned before conviction.195 Simply put, without earning
power or community resources, prisoners will be forced to forgo litigation
because they are poor—not because their case is poor.
191 141

CONG. REC. 27,044 (1995) (statement of Sen. Thurmond).
U.S.C. § 1915(g) (providing “In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action . . .
under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more occasions, while incarcerated . . .
brought an action or appeal . . . dismissed [as] frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a
claim….) (emphasis added). The mandatory language used—”[i]n no event shall”—
deprives judges of all discretion to take any other action.
193 Id.
194 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(a) (1999) (providing a list of payments, in their order of priority,
that federal prisoners are expected to make while incarcerated and after).
195 SANETA DEVUONO-POWELL ET AL., supra note 149, at 12–13.
192 28
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To ensure that indigent prisoners are able to secure judicial review of
nonfrivolous complaints, § 1915(g) should be amended to add a provision
similar to § 1915(b)(4), stating “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited
from bringing a [nonfrivolous] civil action or appeal[] . . . for the reason
that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the . . . filing
fee.”196 This would eliminate the possibility of barring a colorable claim
simply because a prisoner lacks the means to amass an entire filing fee.
Another way to cure the many problems that § 1915(g) creates—from
Circuit splits on a variety of issues regarding what sorts of dismissals
constitute “strikes,” to the time-consuming exercise courts are required to
perform in identifying three strikes and then analyzing any claim of
“imminent danger of serious physical injury”—is to repeal § 1915(g).197
While this may sound drastic, it would empower courts to quickly dispose
of prisoner actions that are frivolous through the PLRA’s screening
mechanism of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and to use the full panoply of
sanctioning authority courts have for vexatious litigants.198
Under § 1915A, courts “shall review, before docketing, . . . or . . . as
soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a
prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee,”
and “shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of the complaint” that “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.”199 The sponsors of the PLRA
repeatedly emphasized facially meritless complaints to support the limits on
prisoner litigation they were proposing—”insufficient storage locker space,

196 28

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4).
U.S.C. § 1915(g).
198 As the Supreme Court has explained, “the PLRA mandates early judicial screening of
prisoner complaints” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 202 (2007);
see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (requiring courts to “screen” prisoner complaints and dismiss
those that are “frivolous, malicious or fail[] to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted”).
199 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(a), (b).
197 28
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a defective haircut by a prison barber, the failure or prison officials to invite
a prisoner to a pizza party for a departing prison employee, and yes, being
served chunky peanut butter instead of the creamy variety.”200 Any patently
frivolous lawsuits could be dismissed upon screening under § 1915A,
saving courts from having to pour through a prisoner’s prior litigation,
determine whether three dismissals constitute strikes, and then evaluate if
the prisoner alleged “imminent danger.”201
For those litigants who repeatedly abuse the courts by filing frivolous or
vexatious litigation, courts may impose a variety of sanctions on a litigant
tailored to curb the specific behavior being evidenced. From monetary
sanctions to filing injunctions, courts derive authority to sanction abusive
litigants from 28 U.S.C. § 1927, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
their “inherent powers that are ‘governed not by rule or statute but by the
control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to
achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.’”202 The latter
authority includes the imposition of filing injunctions against litigants who
demonstrate a pattern of filing frivolous lawsuits.203 To this end, “courts
may resort to restrictive measures that except from normally available
procedures litigants who have abused their litigation opportunities,”
including “prohibit[ing] [a litigant] from obtaining in forma pauperis
status,” “completely foreclosing the filing of designated categories of
cases,” or “subjecting a vexatious litigant to a ‘leave of court’ requirement
200 152

CONG. REC. 14,413 (1995) (statement of Sen. Dole).
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (b), with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
202 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (“Any . . . person . . . who so multiplies the proceedings in any case
unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the
excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such
conduct”); FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c) (permitting a court to sanction a litigant to “deter
repetition of the conduct” and stating that the sanction may consist of monetary or
“nonmonetary directives”); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(3) (providing for sanctions for
improper certification); FED. R. CIV. P. 37 (permitting sanctions for discovery abuses);
FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b) (providing for involuntary dismissal of an action for failure to
prosecute); Dietz v. Boudlin, 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1891 (2016).
203 In re Martin-Trigona, 9 F.3d 226, 228–29 (2d Cir. 1993).
201 Compare
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with respect to future filings.”204 Between the screening mechanism of 28
U.S.C. § 1915A and the scope of sanctions available to judges to curb
vexatious litigation, courts already have far less arduous procedures to
quickly dispose of frivolous lawsuits and penalize litigants who abuse the
courts. In the end, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) does little to ease the burdens on the
federal courts, and it ofttimes prevents courts from efficiently managing
their dockets. Additionally, § 1915(g) does—in its present state—create a
system whereby indigent prisoners may lose their right to access the courts.

CONCLUSION
Since 1892, Congress and the federal courts have recognized that a
person’s finances should not determine whether an action can be filed in
federal court.205 As the Supreme Court has stated, the in forma pauperis
statute “is intended to guarantee that no citizen shall be denied an
opportunity [to seek judicial redress] . . . ‘in any court of the United States’
solely because his poverty makes it impossible for him to pay or secure the
costs.”206 However, when the PLRA became law, no safeguard was
provided to ensure that indigent prisoners falling under § 1915(g) would not
be prevented from filing nonfrivolous actions because of their lack of funds.
As this article details, the majority of prisoners lack employment that would
enable them to earn money, many are constrained by outstanding financial
obligations that take priority over the payment of newly accrued filing fees,
and many cannot raise the necessary funds from outside community

204 Id.

(collecting cases).
of July 20, 1892, ch. 209, § 1, 27 Stat. 252 (providing that “any citizen of the
United States . . . may commence and prosecute to conclusion any such suit or action
without being required to prepay fees or costs”); Adkins v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co., 335 U.S. 331, 342 (1948) (stating that “no citizen [sh]ould be denied an opportunity
to commence, prosecute, or defend an action, civil or criminal, in any court of the United
States, solely because his poverty makes it impossible for him to pay or secure the court
costs”).
206 Adkins, 335 U.S. at 342.
205 Act
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resources.207 It is foolish to contend that the bulk of U.S. prisoners are in a
position to “save up” hundreds of dollars to pay a lump-sum filing fee.208
The courthouse doors are being slammed in the faces of impoverished §
1915(g) litigants who seek to file nonfrivolous lawsuits but cannot raise
$400 to do so. This is contrary to the stated intentions of the sponsors of the
PLRA and falls afoul of the Supreme Court’s consistent holdings that
nonfrivolous actions by impoverished litigants should be allowed to
proceed in forma pauperis.209 To ensure that the First Amendment’s
guarantee of access to the courts is not eroded, § 1915(g) should be
amended or repealed.210

207 See

supra Part III.
v. Melvin, 873 F.3d 957, 959–60 (7th Cir. 2017).
209 See supra notes 191–192 (quoting the PLRA’s co-sponsors’ assurances that
nonfrivolous lawsuits would not be barred from review under the PLRA); see also Ellis
v. United States, 356 U.S. 674, 675 (1958) (per curiam) (“unless the issues raised are so
frivolous that the appeal would be dismissed in the case of a nonindigent litigant, . . . the
request of an indigent for leave to appeal in forma pauperis must be allowed”).
210 U.S. CONST. amend. I (stating that Congress “shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the
right of the people . . . to petition the government for a redress of grievances”).
208 Sanders

VOLUME 19 • ISSUE 2 • 2021

503

504 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

